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What Happens to the Iraqi Oil?:
Thoughts on Some Significant,
Unexamined International Legal
Questions Regarding Occupation
of Oil Fields
R. Dobie Langenkamp* and Rex J. Zedalis**

Abstract
Possible US and allied occupation of Iraqi oil fields following any military action against
Saddam Hussein would raise a variety of interesting legal issues under the international law
of belligerent occupation. With specific regard to Article 55 of the 1907 Hague Regulations
on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, an occupant’s treatment of state-owned
immovables, such as oil reserves, must accord with the rules of usufruct. In the essay that
follows, the authors look at how the rules of usufruct affect three particular matters that have
not previously received extensive consideration: (1) the latitude of an occupant to employ
sophisticated producing technologies that increase the degree to which an oil field may be
swept clean; (2) the permissibility of increasing the rate or volume at which oil is produced
from a particular field; and, (3) the uses to which an occupant may put either the oil produced
or the proceeds from sales of such. The authors suggest that a usufructuary is permitted to
exercise a rather broad, though not unlimited, discretion in connection with selecting
extraction technologies and rates of production. As for how the oil produced or the proceeds
from such may be used, it is suggested that international law forbids any use that can be seen
as being for the enrichment of the occupant.

1 Introduction
The law of belligerent occupation is replete with enough fascinating issues to keep an
energetic lawyer riveted for well more than a single lifetime. In the context of the
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international situation regarding Iraq, several such issues present themselves.1 The
specific focus of this short essay, however, concerns the narrow and limited question
of the rights and responsibilities connected with possible US and allied occupation of
the Iraqi oil fields.2 No consideration is given to the question of whether UN approval
of the use of military force against Iraq would reconfigure those rights and
responsibilities,3 or whether some current scheme, such as the UN’s Oil-for-Food
programme,4 or a scheme, the existence of which has yet to receive public
acknowledgement,5 may alter the rights and responsibilities of the occupying power.

1

2

3

4
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Just in the context of occupation of the oil fields, there may be issues regarding: protective seizure of the
fields to prevent destruction comparable to that in Kuwait during the Persian Gulf War in 1991; the
circumstances under which privately owned oil in storage, or reserves that may be designated as private,
can be accessed by an occupant; the ability of an occupant to take the necessary commercial actions to
rehabilitate the oil fields and get them up and running; an occupant’s authority to oversee and facilitate,
or modify and completely alter, the legal system that would be charged with resolving civil and
commercial disputes that may arise in connection with occupation of the oil fields; the authority of an
occupant to dissolve and terminate business relationships between existing commercial enterprises,
many of which may be apparatuses of the sure-to-be eliminated ruling elite in the state occupied; the
right of an occupant to establish the conditions under which a provisional, and then permanent,
government would eventually resume control of the oil fields.
In regard to Iraq’s oil reserves, they are estimated in the vicinity of 112 billion barrels. See International
Petroleum Encyclopedia (2002) 99. There are major fields with major reserves in the Kurdish north, the
central portion of the country, and in the south around Rumalia, Majnoon, and West Qurna. Currently
Iraq produces approximately 2.4 million barrels per day, under very difficult circumstances. See Energy
Information Administration, U.S. Dept of Energy, www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/iraq (2001 daily
average; current sustainable capacity is thought to be at least 2.8 million, and Iraq had announced a goal
of producing 3.1 million by the end of 2002) (accessed 10 Dec. 2002). Saddam Hussein has estimated
that in optimum conditions Iraq could produce up to 6 million barrels per day. Given the fact that he was
responsible for Iraq’s oil programme in the 1970s — prior to his taking over the reigns of the presidency
— he is undoubtedly more knowledgeable than most heads of state. See generally U.S. Federal Energy
Administration, The Relationship of Oil Companies and Foreign Governments (June 1975), at 81.
On the question of whether military forces operating under United Nations authority remain subject to
the law of armed conflict, see generally Institut de droit international, ‘Resolution on the Conditions of
Application of Humanitarian Rules of Armed Conflict to Hostilities in which United Nations Forces may
be Engaged’, 54 (II) Annuaire de L’Institut de droit Int’l (1971) 465; ICRC Symposium on Humanitarian
Action and Peacekeeping Operations (1994); L. Condorelli et. al. (eds), The United Nations and International
Humanitarian Law (1996); C. J. Greenwood, ‘International Humanitarian Law and United Nations
Military Operations’, 1 Yb. Int’l Humanitarian L. (1998) 3; C. Greenwood, ‘International Law and the
Conduct of Military Operations: Stocktaking at the Start of a New Millennium’, 75 U.S Naval War College,
International Legal Studies (2000) 179, at 192–194.
On the Oil-for-Food programme, see generally U.S. Dept. of State, Oil-for-Food Program (20 Dec. 2002),
available at www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/16176.htm (accessed 9 Feb. 2003); UN Office of the Iraq
Programme, Oil-for-Food Programme: A Fact-Sheet (Feb. 2003), available at www.un.org/Depts/oip/
background/fact-sheet.html (accessed 9 Feb. 2003).
Occasional references have appeared in the media regarding discussions designed to focus on the matter
of control of the oil fields and their production. See ‘Iraqi Oil Strategy Divides State’, White House, News
World Communications (28 Dec. 2002) (infighting within the Bush Administration, with some in
National Security Council and Defense Department opposing role for the United Nations), available at
www.globalpolicy.org/security/oil/2002/1228divides.htm (accessed 9 Feb. 2003). One possible scheme
could be an early provisional agreement followed by a more detailed status of forces agreement giving the
US and its allies broad powers in the commercial area, including in the production of petroleum.
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presumably for a variety of reasons, the Bush administration has chosen not to
highlight the question of oil field occupation in its public statements regarding Iraq.6
But since the law of belligerent occupation as applied to oil fields7 was last examined
nearly 30 years ago in connection with Israeli exploitation of oil in both the Sinai and
the Gulf of Suez after the 1973 October War,8 new insights regarding the arguments
proffered on that body of law and advancements in the technology for developing and
producing oil reserves all suggest the importance of revisiting this sure-to-be
controversial subject.
In connection with the very particular question taken up in this essay, it seems safe
to say that the settled law applicable to an occupation of the Iraqi oil fields includes the
notions that the occupant is permitted to regulate commerce in the occupied
territory,9 take possession of financial instruments, stores and all movable property of
6

7

8

9

At least two reasons spring readily to mind. First, France, Russia and other European nations have long
had business relations with the Iraqi oil industry, and any suggestion that matters concerning control of
the Iraqi oil fields were near the head of the US agenda could, especially given the potential for
disagreement among allies, complicate the Bush administration’s efforts to build a military coalition
against Saddam Hussein. Second, too much public attention focused on matters concerning occupation
of the oil fields could, in the minds of some, corroborate suspicions that military action against Iraq was
about oil, not Saddam Hussein and weapons of mass destruction. It should be noted that in an interview
on Public Broadcasting Services ‘The News Hour with Jim Lehrer’, 20 Feb. 2003, U.S. Secretary of
Defense, Donald Rumsfeld indicated Iraqi oil belonged to the Iraqi people and post-war handling of the
petroleum would be consistent with that idea. For a critique of the Bush administration’s reticence on this
point, see R. Dobie Langenkamp, ‘Iraq: Finding Room for the Law in a War Debate’, Middle East Economic
Survey, 24 Feb. 2003, at A4.
There is little likelihood that the US could make a persuasive argument that action against Iraq would not
leave it in the position of a belligerent occupant. The fact that the US may act under clear formal
authorization from the United Nations, or on the basis of its interpretation of earlier United Nations
resolutions concerning Iraq, would not seem to alter this conclusion. On the applicability of the law of
war to United Nations operations, see supra note 3. Moreover, in view of the fact that there is no doubt
that the government of Iraq has had control over its sovereign territory, it could not be maintained that it
is open and available for any nation to assert control. For discussion of an attempt by another to make the
argument that, in an earlier context, it was not a belligerent occupant, see A. Gerson, Off-Shore Oil
Exploration by Belligerent Occupant: The Gulf of Suez Dispute, infra note 8, at 726–727 (unwillingness to
concede applicability of law of belligerent occupancy to Sinai because of implicit recognition of Egyptian
sovereignty). Regarding arguments disputing belligerent occupant status generally, see E. Benvenisti,
The International Law of Occupation (1993), at 211–212.
See Cummings, ‘Oil Resources in Occupied Arab Territories under the Law of Belligerent Occupation’, 9
J. Int’l L. & Econ. (1974) 592; Gerson, ‘War, Conquered Territory, and Military Occupation in the
Contemporary International Legal System’, 18 Harv. Int’l L.J. (1977) 525; Gerson, ‘Off-Shore Oil
Exploration by a Belligerent Occupant: The Gulf of Suez Dispute’, 71 AJIL (1978) 725; ‘Dept. of State
Memorandum of Law on Israel’s Right to Develop New Oil Fields in Sinai and Gulf of Suez’, reprinted in 16
ILM (1977) 733; ‘Ministry of Foreign Affairs Memorandum of Law on the Right to Develop New Fields in
Sinai and the Gulf of Suez’, 17 ILM (1978) 432; Claggett and Johnson, ‘May Israel as a Belligerent
Occupant Lawfully Exploit Previously Unexploited Oil Resources of the Gulf of Suez?’, 72 AJIL (1978)
558.
On the matter of economic regulation by a belligerent occupant and a discussion of the relevant
provisions from the Hague Regulations, see generally E. A. Feilchenfeld, The International Economic Law of
Belligerent Occupation (1942). For an interesting and current examination of the general law of
belligerent occupation, especially with regard to post-World War II occupations, see Benvenisti, supra
note 7.
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the state which may be used for operations of war,10 and requisition private movable
property.11 Further, the 1907 Hague Regulations on the Laws and Customs of War on
Land provide that an occupant is also entitled to use all immovable property of the
occupied state.12 Article 55’s declaration in this respect indicates that ‘the occupying
State shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary of public buildings,
real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State’ and that the
occupant ‘must safeguard the capital of these properties, and administer them in
accordance with the rules of usufruct’.13 Under Article 55, the earlier Sinai and Gulf of
Suez exploitation raised the problematic questions of whether seized oil wells, long
considered immovable property,14 could be worked by occupying forces, and whether
new wells could be drilled in previously undeveloped fields. The sophisticated legal
analyses emerging from that Israeli occupation resulted in thoroughly considered
views, all of which endorsed the belligerent occupant’s right to exploit oil fields, to one
degree or another. At one end of the spectrum was the position that, under the rules of
usufruct, only existing wells lawfully could be produced.15 At the other end it was said
that only wanton waste or destruction of oil resources by the occupant was forbidden
and, since new activity in developed or undeveloped oil fields was not aimed at the
requisite ‘spoilation’ of oil resources, such activity was clearly permitted.16 Between
these positions, yet situated closer to the latter view approving of new oil drilling
activity, was the understanding that the rules of usufruct seemed open to all efforts
having the effect of enhancing the value of occupied oil fields.17
The intervening decades have managed to sharpen the relevant legal issues
regarding the conduct of oil field occupants. Questions now seem to exist about
whether those who had earlier examined the law in connection with Israel’s activities
in the Sinai and the Gulf of Suez provided a portrayal adequately accounting for all the
key uncertainties that both time and the complexity of the oil business would
eventually reveal. Three uncertainties in particular provide the focus of this essay. The
first derives from the variety of views on existing versus new wells and development
activity prompted by Israel’s earlier occupation, and it concerns specifically the legal
treatment to be accorded to techniques that would allow one to ‘sweep’ an existing
10

11
12

13

14
15

16
17

See generally G. von Glahn, Law among Nations (1965) 685 (discussing and analysing the relevant
provisions from the Hague Regulations).
Ibid., at 686–687 (examining the controlling rules from the Hague Regulations).
See Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Art. 55, annexed to Hague
Convention (No. 4) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed 18 Oct. 1907.
Ibid., at Art. 55. This provision had its early origins in the first modern code of belligerent occupation, the
‘Lieber Code’, drafted by theorist Frances Lieber, ‘for use by Union troops in their occupation of the
Confederacy. Art. 31 of that Code essentially provided that a victorious army . . . sequesters for its own
benefit or that of its government all the revenues of real property belonging to the hostile government or
nation. Title to such real property remains in abeyance during occupation’. See generally D. A. Graber,
Development of the Law of Belligerent Occupation 1863–1914 (1968).
See N.V. de Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij v. The War Damage Commission, infra note 62.
See Claggett and Johnson, supra note 8; Cummings, supra note 8; Dep’t of State Memorandum, supra note
8.
See generally Government of Israel, ‘Memorandum of Law’, reprinted in 17 ILM (1978) 432.
See Gerson, ‘Off-Shore Oil Exploration’, supra note 8.
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field clean of virtually all recoverable oil deposits. Presumably, some of the same
reasons prompting concern about the lawfulness of new development activity in the
oil fields could raise the red flag when it comes to the use of such technologies. The
second, and related, uncertainty has to do with whether production limits are
inherent in the rule of usufruct. To the extent that current Iraqi production falls short
of what its fields are capable of producing day in, day out, any rate or volume increases
in daily production would be sure to present that question. If one accepts the view that
Article 55 permits only the working of existing wells, is it reasonable to understand
the usufructuary as entitled to make dramatic increases in production from those
wells by installing new and better equipment and using other advanced production
techniques? And finally, there is the whole matter of the uses to which a belligerent
occupant is entitled to put either the oil produced from occupation activities or the
proceeds from the sale of that production. Given the costs associated with military
action against, and occupation of, Iraq, the suggestion is quite likely to surface that
the oil or its proceeds be used to defray such. But to what extent does Article 55 and
international law limit an occupant’s latitude in deciding how the benefits of an
occupation are to be applied? The following pages examine each of these uncertainties
in the context of the current situation, with the objective of offering a perspective on
the controlling legal standards that goes beyond the more contextually narrow
observations emerging from the Sinai and Gulf of Suez situations.

2 Sweeping Currently Worked Oil Fields Clean
Oil field production operations designed to maximize recovery can take several
different forms. They can involve so-called ‘infill’ activity, in which new wells are
drilled to further access a deposit under current exploitation.18 They can also involve
‘directional’ or ‘sidetrack’ drilling, in which the path of an existing well is varied in
order to reach different portions of an oil reservoir.19 Additionally, in an attempt to
increase production without the drilling of new wells, existing wells may be reworked
by replacement of down-hole pumps and tubing, acidization, re-fracing, or by the
injection of water, surfacants, CO2 or natural gas.20 In all such cases, the basic idea is
to extend the productive life of the deposit by employing technologies providing
increases in the amount of oil recoverable from a particular field.
The broad perspective on what a belligerent occupant may do under Article 55’s
reference to the rules of usufruct21 would clearly support ‘infill’ activity. To that way of
reading the controlling rules, the drilling of new wells, irrespective of whether in
18

19

20

21

See R. D. Langenkamp, The Illustrated Petroleum Reference (4th ed., 1996) 123. See generally, M. Gerding
(ed.), Fundamentals of Petroleum (1986).
See Langenkamp, supra note 18, at 408. See also Gerding, supra note 18, at 166 (also referred to as ‘slant
drilling’).
See Gerding, supra note 18, at 97, et seq. (water injection for pressure maintenance referred to as
‘waterflooding’; steam injection referred to as ‘steamflooding’ or ‘huff and puff’; and CO2 or other gas
injection procedures known as ‘secondary or tertiary recovery’). ‘Fracing’ is the process of injecting a
fine-grained sand into the production formation under high pressure.
See authorities cited supra notes 16 and 17.
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currently exploited or wholly unexploited fields, is permitted.22 The drilling of ‘infill’
wells is more problematic under the restrictive view of usufruct, however. Though not
crystal clear, that view can be understood as prohibiting not just the drilling of wells in
oil fields that were undeveloped at the time of occupation, but also new wells in fields
already under development.23 To the extent that the latter implication is pressed, the
persuasiveness of the restrictive view would seem subject to some doubt. If good
engineering practice indicates that drilling an infill well is preferable to a mere
pressure maintenance technique operated through existing wells, how could a
usufructuary fail to do so without being seen as having acted less than reasonably?24
It should be kept in mind that, while there may be much to support the
persuasiveness of the general proposition, inherent in the restrictive view, that there is
to be ‘no new development’, the language of Article 55 requires only that property
under the control of the belligerent be ‘administer[ed]’ in accordance with the rules of
usufruct, including the mandate that the belligerent must ‘safeguard the capital’.25
One distinguished legal authority interpreted that requirement as prohibiting a
belligerent from ‘appropriat[ing] or alienat[ing] public immovable property’, but
permitting ‘appropriat[ion] [of] . . . the produce’ of such property.26 A major work of
two other renowned international scholars restated it as prohibiting an occupant
from ‘wantonly dissipat[ing] or destroy[ing] the public resources’ or ‘permanently
(i.e., for the indefinite future) alienat[ing] them (salva rerum substantia)’.27 The British
Manual of Military Operations suggests the interpretation that the usufructuary ‘must
not exceed what is necessary or usual’ in the working of the relevant resource.28 As
understood in the civil law tradition, from whence Article 55’s reference is derived,
the required administration and capital preservation have been described as
authorizing the ‘using and taking of fruits or property belonging to another —
without the right of destroying or changing the character of [the] thing, and lasting
only as long as the character remains unchanged’.29 This is consonant with the
English common law tradition which, under the parallel ‘open mine’ doctrine
governing life tenancies,30 has been described by Blackstone as prohibiting activities
22
23

24
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30

See the restrictive view’s qualification on this assertion offered in the text accompanying infra note 24.
See authorities cited supra note 15. Claggett and Johnson indicate the impermissibility of new wells, but
do so in the context of a dispute regarding the development of the previously undeveloped Gulf of Suez
area. Cummings also indicates impermissibility, but does so in regard to the previously worked Abu
Rhodeis fields in the Sinai.
If unexploited reserves exist between two wells, an ‘infill’ well in between may be superior in all respects
to an attempt to produce those reserves with the injection of fluids in one of the existing wells.
Art. 55 of Hague Regulations.
See Wheaton’s International Law, vol. 2 (7th ed., 1944) 258.
See M. McDougal and F. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order (1961) 812–813.
See Great Britain, War Office, The Law of War on Land Being Part III of the Manual of Military Law (1958), at
sec. 610. See also M. Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land Warfare (1959) 288 (‘exploitation may not
exceed what is usual or necessary’).
See H. Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law (2nd ed., 1967), at 282; Lord Mackenzie,
Studies in Roman Law, vol. 1 (1898), at 187; H. Roby, Roman Private Law (1902), at 484–497.
See McClean, ‘The Common Law Life Estate and the Civil Law Usufruct: A Comparative Study’, 12 ICLQ
(1963) 649, at 665.
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that are a ‘detriment to the inheritance’, that inheritance being, specifically, the
property to be returned to the original owner or sovereign.31
Clearly, any candid evaluation of whether such descriptions of the law are sufficient
to indicate that something akin to ‘infill’ drilling runs afoul of Article 55’s
requirements would have to acknowledge substantial hesitancy. Indeed, in light of the
breadth of concepts such as ‘administer’, ‘safeguard’, ‘necessary or usual’, ‘destroying
or changing the character’, and ‘detriment’, at least some room would seem to exist
for viewing new ‘infill’ drilling activity in a developed field as permitted under even the
stingiest or cribbed reading of the rules of usufruct. After all, in the usual course of
things, those in charge of exploiting an oil deposit would surely avail themselves of
such an option. It is unlikely that another would be heard to suggest that the doing so
amounted to a clear failure to ‘safeguard’ the deposit, or proved ‘[un]necessary or
[un]usual’, or ‘destroy[ed] or chang[ed] [its] character’. Though it may be insisted
that many statements can be found to the effect that the rule of usufruct permits only
the working of mines or wells in existence at the commencement of occupation,32 the
very language of Article 55 itself, and the way that language has been characterized
by leading scholars, suggests that room is present to reasonably understand the use of
customary and prudent life-extending practices, like ‘infill’ drilling, as within the
‘usual’, ‘non-destructive’ techniques one charged with safeguarding a developed oil
field would readily employ.
With respect to well reworking, acidization, refracing, and injection techniques, all
of which can take advantage of existing wells and avoid new drilling, possible
limitations on oil field activities inherent in Article 55 would prove important under
both the broad and the restrictive readings of the rule of usufruct. After all, whether one
is concerned with an existing well, or a new well in an already developed or previously
undeveloped field, the centrality of potential restrictions on the degree to which the oil
deposit tapped can be fully produced is indubitably clear. Conduct otherwise thought
lawful might be deemed beyond the realm of what Article 55 permits. Given that the
techniques referenced herein can be employed without new drilling, they would
appear less of a concern than ‘infill’ activity to proponents of the restrictive view.
Surely, using existing wells to aid in the pumping of oil presents fewer problems than
does the drilling of new ones. Nonetheless, to the extent that a belligerent occupant
looks at increasing the lifetime total output from a particular field through the use of
31

32

See W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1884), at 281–282. See also McClean, supra
note 30, indicating that neither a life tenant under the open mine doctrine, nor a usufructuary, may
‘mine or quarry, except where this was a normal method of exploitation’ (emphasis added). Under some
readings, this observation could be taken as suggesting something about the nature, character or
manner by which exploitation is to take place.
It is often noted that classical Roman law stood for the proposition that a usufructuary could take the
products of mines and quarries, but ‘only in so far as the mines and quarries were being worked at the
commencement of the usufruct’. See C. Sherman, Roman Law in the Modern World (1937) 165. See
generally Pugliese, ‘On Roman Usufruct’, 40 Tulane L. Rev. (1960) 523, at 546–547, indicating that a
variety of civil codes made the opening of new mines or quarries impermissible. See also, J. Thomas (ed.),
A Systematic Arrangement of Lord Coke’s First Institute of the Laws of England, vol. 1, Book II, Ch. LIII,
(1836), at 188, to the effect that ‘Digging for gravel, lime, clay, brick, earth, stone, or the like, or for mines
of metal, coal, or the like, hidden in the earth, and were not open when the tenant came in, is waste . . .’
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technological innovations, thereby acting on customary good petroleum engineering
practice, the possibility that the rules of usufruct restrict the operator’s options merits
at least brief consideration.
From what was alluded to earlier in connection with the permissibility of ‘infill’
drilling,33 there can be little question about the absence of tight and explicit
controlling legal principles. In such a context, the strength of any suggestion
regarding the meaning of a rule cast in terms as general as those regarding the rule of
usufruct would seem influenced by the reasonableness of the suggestion. And given
the legitimacy of concerns about the consumption of natural resources, would there
not seem a modicum of appeal in the suggestion that resource deposits lawfully under
development be exploited as thoroughly and efficiently as possible? Would it not seem
more appropriate to read Article 55 as entitling an occupant to employ advanced
technologies in the oil field than to compel reliance on production practices that result
in inefficient and less than optimum extraction of the resources available in a certain
deposit? In a world in which, to many, wastefulness of resources has come to
exemplify modern existence, simply to state the question of whether a usufructuary is
entitled by the law to rely on technologies that permit a more complete utilization of
an oil deposit provides its own answer.
Beyond this, however, another reason exists for suggesting that Article 55, even
though unclear, is best read as incorporating a permission for oil field occupants to
employ reworking, acidization, refracing, injection and associate technologies.
Specifically, the reason has to do with the avoidance of interpretations of the rule of
usufruct that interfere with full utilization of existing wells, thereby inclining one
towards the drilling of new wells in developed or undeveloped fields. This reason
derives from the confluence of three of the most fundamental precepts governing
belligerent occupancy: first, occupancy is a temporary condition;34 second, immovables are to be protected and returned at the end of the occupation;35 and third,
produce issuing from the occupied immovable may be used by the occupying power
during the occupation — the precept creating the divergence between the broad and
the restrictive views on usufruct. Collectively, these precepts suggest, especially when
it is recognized that some produce may be regenerative (e.g., timber, crops), while
others, like oil, may be finite, that even complete and exhaustive utilization of finite
resources in some identifiable deposits could be preferable to inefficient, quick-anddirty tapping of such resources on a haphazard and widespread basis.36 Would it not
seem reasonable to suggest that, in the case of exhaustible natural resources, one
33
34

35

36

See supra text accompanying notes 22–31.
See Graber, supra note 13 at 37, et seq. See also C. C. Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and
Applied by the United States, vol. III ( 2nd ed., 1945) 1896; U.S. v. Rice, 4 Wheaton 254 (Sup. Ct. 1819).
See U.S. Army Field Manual on the Law of Land Warfare, infra note 64, at paras 400, 402. See also Graber,
supra note 13, at 171 et seq.
It must be acknowledged that this argument seems unconvincing if one starts from the position that it is
impermissible under the rules of usufruct to drill any new wells, including infill wells. However, it would
certainly seem true that such an extremely restrictive view of the law would be at much greater peril of
violation when coupled with a prohibition on practices like ‘directional’ drilling, reworking and well
injection than if understood as accommodating such.
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attractive way to reconcile the conflicting duty to protect immovable state property
and the right of the occupant to use the produce from such, would be to understand
the usufructuary as vested by Article 55 with authority to employ innovative
technologies and customary good oil field engineering practices that help maximize
resource recovery? Would it not seem reasonable to interpret the rules of usufruct as
insisting on the use of technologies that compel an occupant to pursue practices that
result in efficient tapping of an occupied power’s natural resources?37
‘Directional’ or ‘sidetrack’ drilling, which, as in reworking, injection, and associated
practices, involves using an existing well bore, but accesses another portion of a
petroleum deposit, as with ‘infill’ wells, would seem able to take full advantage of the
arguments underpinning the lawfulness of those other activities. Mention of
‘directional’ drilling or ‘sidetracking’, however, provides a chance to proffer yet
another reason suggesting the persuasiveness of interpreting Article 55 as supporting
a right to employ any of the various sophisticated oil field development efforts referred
to in this section. This reason draws on US domestic oil and gas law and, thus, may be
instructive, but is surely not determinative, in regard to understanding whether the
controlling international legal standards permit the use of such practices. Even in light
of this caveat, the clarity of the US domestic law on the point that an owner of oil and
gas rights for a limited term is vested with wide discretion in selecting among available
technologies for exploiting the resource, despite eventual reversion or transfer to a
future interest holder, is absolutely incontestable. As alluded to earlier,38 this
discretion is based on a tenant’s rights under the ‘open mine’ doctrine.39 The general
rule of that doctrine appears to be that the scope of the right of the party relying
thereon is co-extensive with the terms of the lease governing wells drilled prior to the
tenant having gained possession. If the lease confined wells to a particular formation,
or limited the number of wells that could be drilled, the tenant is similarly confined or
limited. If not, then no such restrictions operate.40 In all cases, however, the tenant is
subject to the ‘prudent operator’ rule, which obligates the tenant to develop the lease
to its fullest extent. This assumes application by the tenant of good oil field practice,
including all known and accepted standard procedures for exploiting available
reserves.41

3 Limitations on Rate or Volume of Oil Field Production
The preceding section focused on whether the rules of usufruct limit a belligerent
occupant’s freedom to use technologies allowing oil to be more completely swept from
37

38
39

40
41

For a distinct, yet somewhat related, argument offered by the United States in the context of its objection
to Israel’s efforts to exploit oil fields in the Gulf of Suez, see Dept of State Memorandum, supra note 8, at
746 (interpretations of Article 55 that provide incentives for occupation, or disincentives for termination
of such, should be avoided).
See supra text accompanying notes 30–31.
See generally H. Williams and C. Meyers, Manual of Oil and Gas Terms (11th ed., 2000) 736; R. W.
Hemingway, The Law of Oil and Gas (1971) 179. Open mine permits a life tenant to continue to
appropriate minerals from a mine or well which was opened prior to the life tenancy’s commencement.
See Hemingway, supra note 39, at 183.
See ibid., at 368.
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existing deposits. In this section, however, the focus is on the related, though distinct,
matter of limits on the amount of production that can be taken from a field at any
given point in time. Restated, while the last section looked at limits on the
thoroughness with which a field may be swept, this section examines whether a
usufructuary is limited in terms of the rate or volume of oil production. Certainly, the
question taken up herein proves extremely relevant irrespective of whether an
occupant is pumping from existing wells, new wells in developed or as yet
undeveloped fields, or through the use of innovative technologies that employ either
new drilling or take advantage of existing holes to produce oil in a developed field from
existing wells. Its relevance is made all the more apparent by indications from
commentators who have considered the matter of oil field occupations that a
usufructuary is limited, at least in some instances, to producing no more product from
an immovable under occupancy than was produced at the time the occupancy
commenced.42
Perhaps the principal source of authority for the proposition of a limitation on the
rate or volume of an occupant’s production appears to be the decision, under Article
55 of the Hague Regulations, in the case of Administration of Waters and Forests v. Falck
(1927).43 There a French court was presented with the claim that the cutting, by one
acting under the authority of the German occupant, of state-owned trees at a rate well
in excess of the permitted rate of harvest set forth in the French Forest Code, violated
the rules of usufruct codified in Article 55. This authority is unequivocal. And,
admittedly, if Iraq has established, as have regulatory organs within many nations
concerned about maintaining optimum sustainable production levels, a specific
standard setting out ‘allowable’ levels of production from an oil well,44 then
production by a belligerent occupant at a rate in excess of that level would certainly
have every appearance of being violative of the decision in Falck and, thus, contrary to
the occupant’s rights and responsibilities under Article 55. Just as with the French
Forest Code, oil and gas ‘allowables’ in territory occupied by a belligerent presumably
establish production rates reflecting what those familiar with the prevailing
conditions in that territory would suggest as the maximum permitted under good,
prudent oil field operations. Production at a rate in excess would not be consistent
prudent practice and could be argued to support the view of damage to the reservoir.
A couple of very important points need to kept in mind in connection with any such
reading of the Falck case, however. First, situations involving forests and easily
42
43

44

See Claggett and Johnson, supra note 8, at 574, n. 82.
3 Ann. Dig. (Court of Nancy, France, 1926) 480 (lower court determination that the necessities of
modern warfare, with the demands of large occupying armies, required reading Art. 55 in a broad way
allowing no limits on the rate or volume of production); 4 Ann. Dig. (Court of Cassation, France, 1927)
563 (reversing the lower court).
On such ‘allowables’ in, for example, the United States, see F. Giuliano (ed.), Introduction to Oil and Gas
Technology (1985), at 123, for examples of allowables under Texas state law, see Rules 39–45 of Texas
Rules for Oil, Gas and Geothermal Operations, promulgated by the Texas Railroad Commn, in Statewide
Rules for Oil, Gas and Geothermal Operations, Oil and Gas Division, Texas Railroad Commn (1997), at
158–169. Allowables are customarily set by the conservation or oil and gas regulatory commission of
each producing state.

What Happens to the Iraqi Oil?

427

depleted resources should be distinguished from those involving oil reserves as vast as
Iraq’s. Would it not be reasonable to suggest that the restriction on the rate of
production articulated in Falck becomes increasingly less persuasive whenever the
resource of concern is particularly abundant within the territory occupied? Admittedly, timber is a renewable resource, while oil is not. This suggests that if Article 55 is
seen as placing limits on the rate of production from an occupied territory’s forests,
then surely such should exist in the context of oil fields. But clear-cutting a forest, or
cutting it at a rate in excess of an ‘allowable’ that incorporates regeneration time,
would seem entirely different from accelerating the pumping of oil from Iraqi oil fields.
According to estimates of Iraqi reserves, at current rates of production, it would take
128 years to completely produce that nation’s oil wealth.45 Would it be reasonable to
expect complaint if Iraq’s 112 billion barrel reserves were returned after, say, five
years, with production up from 2.4 million46 to 5.4 million barrels per day, and
reserves, consequently, reduced by an additional 5.5 billion barrels, to 102.1 billion,
rather than 107.6 billion? There is a certain attractiveness to a restriction on the rate
of production when, like timber, the amount of a resource is limited to start with, and
it takes considerable time for the resource to replenish itself. But what is it that makes
such a restriction compelling when the resource is as abundant as in the case of Iraqi
oil?
At (US)$25 per barrel, the cash flow generated under the greater production level of
5.4 million barrels per day would amount to $49.3 billion per year, compared to
$21.9 billion under the lower limit. In the end, this substantial supplementation
would fall to the Iraqis. Additionally, since economic valuation of oil reserves places
greater weight on current production (i.e., ‘proved producing reserves’), than it does
on yet-to-produce (‘proved non-producing’) or likely-to-produce (‘proved undeveloped or probable’) reserves, the conversion of reserves to the producing category
would greatly enhance fair market value. Proved producing reserves — wells
currently demonstrating productive capacity — may be worth four times ‘probable’
reserves which have yet to demonstrate productive capacity.47 When it comes to
resources like timber in a forest, however, excessive harvesting would actually
diminish the value of the land returned to a successor. Oil reserves of the magnitude of
Iraq’s are so extensive that the issue of depletion, arguably the central notion behind
the Falck decision, swallows up concerns regarding the rate of production. It would
not seem beyond the realm of possibility that, if occupying forces merely marked time
with Iraqi production and returned it unenhanced several years later, claims of a
violation of the duty of a usufructuary would appear particularly resonant.
The second point that must be kept in mind in relation to the Falck decision
45
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This is based on taking current production of 2.4 million barrels per day, multiplying it by 365 days,
yielding a yearly total of 876 million barrels. That figure is then divided into current Iraqi reserves of 112
billion barrels.
See supra note 2.
According to the Society of Petroleum Evaluating Engineers (SPEE), the value of a barrel of proved
producing reserves was from 3.96 to 5.5 times as great as a barrel of probable reserves. See SPEE Fifteenth
Annual Survey of Economic Parameters (June 1996). See also Garb, ‘Oil and Gas Reserves Classification,
Estimation, and Evaluation’, J. Petroleum Tech. (March, 1985) 373.
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concerns the possibility that the occupied state may have, as France did in its Forest
Code, production ‘allowables’ in place at the time the occupying force commences its
operations. Though nothing in the language of that earlier decision makes clear what
exact role the existence of the Forest Code’s restriction played in the Court reaching its
judgment, it would certainly appear that the decision was based on the dictates of
Article 55 of the Hague Regulations, with, perhaps, the restrictions of the French Code
simply providing a convenient way to gauge the precise level of the pre-occupation
rate of production. Accepting this reading of the case, the presence of a production
‘allowable’ would place emphasis on the fact that the rate it sets forth represents a
codification of the collective wisdom in the occupied territory about how fast oil can be
produced without doing damage to the reservoir and impairing optimum production.
Stated another way, the ‘allowable’ established the greatest rate or volume of
production consistent with the prudent oil field practice.
In the event that the significance of ‘allowables’ is understood in the fashion
described, rather than as a pre-existent regulatory standard that directly binds the
occupying belligerent, it would seem that, given the earlier views on immovable
state-owned resources as abundant as Iraq’s oil reserves,48 production rates in excess
of ‘allowables’ could be seen as creating a rebuttable presumption of contravention of
Article 55’s controlling international standard. Falck indicates that the Hague article
prohibits production rates exceeding pre-occupation levels. Those levels can be
ascertained by reference to pre-existent regulatory production limits. As such limits
typically reflect the consensus regarding rates of production consistent with
optimizing sustainable resource utilization, inherent in Article 55’s rules of usufruct is
the notion that rates of production must be in line with sound, prudent oil field
practice. Production that maximizes output without damaging the reservoir is
permitted. However, since the potential is always present that a pre-occupation
‘allowable’ may not, for whatever reason, replicate or parallel the determinative
international standard that zeroes in on prudent oil field practice, exceeding an
‘allowable’ may be best seen as giving rise to a rebuttable presumption of violation of
Article 55. Production at rates above pre-existent regulatory limits, shifts the burden
to the occupying belligerent to demonstrate that the allegedly excessive rate is
consistent with optimizing resource production without imperilling recovery from the
reservoir.
US domestic oil and gas law, which can be instructive in putting together a coherent
picture of the rights and responsibilities of a belligerent occupant, is clearly brimming
with restrictions on the rate or volume of production. Generally, however, these
restrictions, consistent with what we have just seen, target not rates or volumes of
production as such, but practices that result in the diminution of the total amount of
oil and gas ultimately recovered. Practices of the latter sort are characterized as waste
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See text accompanying supra notes 40–43 (perhaps abundant resources in occupied territory should not
be governed by the Falck decision’s restriction on increases in the rate of production).
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and a breach of the prudent operator’s duty.49 Oil extraction is usually based on three
sources of productive force: gas drive, water drive, or mechanical pump pressure.
Petroleum engineering is designed to utilize these forces in such a manner as to
maximize ultimate recovery over a reasonable time span. To accelerate production
beyond the reasonable level, such as by ‘blowing off the gas cap’50 or prematurely
causing the ‘watering-out’51 of a well is not only bad practice, it is generally actionable
either by state regulatory authorities or co-owners of the well.52 A mineral interest life
tenant who would commit such acts and, thereby, damage the reservoir, would be
liable to the so-called remainderman, the successor in interest, for waste.53
Applying the same reasoning to a belligerent occupant would prohibit increases in
production that result from practices that could be seen as waste or cause damage to
the reservoir. Contravention would violate the occupant’s duty as a usufructuary
under Article 55 of the Hague Regulations. But short of such excess, and within the
band of reasonable production, there would seem to be no fixed production level
mandated. For instance, if a belligerent occupant were to experience an increase in the
rate of production through the installation of new and more efficient pumps, no
breach of the rules of usufruct could successfully be alleged. After all, the belligerent
occupant would have done nothing to accelerate production in such a way as to leave
the reservoir damaged. The total amount of oil ultimately recoverable would not have
necessarily been diminished. In like vein, were the occupant to avoid ‘shutting-in’,
that is to say, closing down, marginally productive wells, opting instead for an
enhanced and more efficient operating plan, no breach could be alleged. The
remainderman — in this case the nation to whom the occupied territory is to be
returned — would have no right to insist on backwardness and inefficiency on the
part of the belligerent occupant. In fact, it would have the right to insist upon
reasonable competence during the temporary occupation period.54
49
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The prudent operator’s standard is that applicable for determining whether an operator has breached the
duty to the owner to use good operating practices. See H. Williams and C. Meyers, Manual of Oil and Gas
Terms (2000) 882. ‘Good oil field practice’ is the term to indicate operations carried out in a good and
workmanlike manner. Ibid., at 475. Sometimes the term ‘maximum efficient rate’ (MER) is used to mean
the maximum rate at which oil can be produced without decline or loss of reservoir pressure. Ibid., at 620.
In some cases, a ‘gas cap allowable’ is mandated to prevent damage to reservoir pressure. See
Langenkamp, supra note 18, at 177.
When excessive amounts of oil or gas are withdrawn from a field, a reservoir can be damaged by
premature water encroachment. See R. D. Langenkamp, Oil Business Fundamentals (1982), at 51.
See Hemingway, supra note 39, at 439 et seq. See also Rule 49 of Texas Rules, supra note 44.
‘Physical waste’, as opposed to ‘economic waste’, is defined as operational losses in the production of oil
and gas by improper dissipation of reservoir pressure or the flaring of gas or spilling of oil. See Williams
and Meyers, supra note 49, at 800. Economic waste is the drilling of more wells than necessary to exploit
a mineral reserve. Ibid.
To this point, we have assumed the production of a single petroleum reservoir or zone beneath the land in
question. In many cases, more than one, and sometimes several zones are present at varying depths.
Frequently, all zones are produced through a single well bore in a ‘dual completion’ or ‘multiple
completion’ operation. In other instances, the zones are accessed seriatim — usually commencing with
the deepest zone. Such dual or multiple zone production techniques are similar to other efficient means of
producing a reservoir, except that two or more reservoirs are ‘stacked’ one upon another. Drilling
concessions internationally, or leases domestically, can be limited to less than all the zones, resulting in
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4 Use of Oil Resources and Revenues
The economic costs associated with US and allied operations in Iraq undoubtedly raise
questions about whether that nation’s vast oil resources might be available for use in
defraying those costs. Unlike, for instance, the complex matter of whether Article 55’s
notion of usufruct contains limits on the types of technologies an occupant can bring
to bear in exploiting the oil fields, the relevant law seems to provide a much clearer
answer. The benefits obtained from a belligerent occupant’s working of immovable
state property, such as oil reserves, can be applied only to defraying the ‘expenses of
the occupation’, and that concept does not extend to the overall costs of the military
operation. A variety of evidentiary sources exist to support that rather unequivocal
conclusion.
To begin with, although Article 55 does not enunciate an explicit restriction on an
occupant’s use of what is produced from a state-owned immovable, several early court
decisions involving related provisions dealing with a belligerent’s rights to requisition,
control movable property, and take items that may be useful in military operations,
suggest the thrust of the relevant Hague Regulations is towards requiring a close tie to
occupation activities. Thus, in Ralli Brothers v. German Government (1923), a
British-German mixed tribunal determined a seizure of cotton in Antwerp and its
subsequent shipment to Germany to have been violative of Article 52 of the Hague
Regulations, as the seizure was not ‘for the needs of the German Army of
multiple ownership of zones that could be intersected by a single well bore. In most states in the US, one
with rights to a deeper/shallower zone must drill their own well and are not able to compel access via an
existing hole. In Iraq, where all depths are government owned (assuming no division by virtue of a
zone-specific concession), the problem of multiple ownership of ‘stacked’ zones is not present. With
regard to belligerent occupancy in such a circumstance, the better view, even under the restrictive
approach to Art. 55, may be to give the usufructuary the right to access all zones available through an
existing well bore. After all, unless one is prepared to characterize an unperforated zone as analogous to
an undeveloped oil field, there are three reasons that would seem to support recognition of such a right in
a belligerent occupant. First, unlike with an undeveloped field, no new well has to be drilled to access the
deeper zone. Second, the practice of tapping at varying depths seems quite usual in the oil business. And
third, since, as the preceding pages of this essay have suggested, it is permissible to use a wide variety of oil
field practices and techniques to exploit a single zone, it seems reasonable to imagine the same latitude
existing in the context of multiple zones. Special persuasiveness would see to attach to these reasons in the
context of seeking to exploit an already perforated shallower zone.
In the event that an unperforated stacked zone extends laterally well beyond the reach of existing
producing zones at shallower levels, one’s position in arguing that it should be treated as an undeveloped
field is strengthened. Conceptually, it seems easier to accept an occupant exploiting an unperforated
stacked zone that has a lateral extent roughly comparable to existing producing zones above than it is to
accept exploitation of one with a vastly greater lateral reach. Again, in the event that the untapped zone
is situated above laterally smaller producing zones, the fact that the untapped zone has already been
perforated erodes such a conceptualization. In such an event, a certain persuasiveness appears from the
fact that the zone has already been drilled and, therefore, cannot be seen as precisely like an undeveloped,
virgin field. Admittedly, with regard to an unperforated deeper zone, the call is much closer. However, it
seems somewhat disconcerting to think that, just because a zone with a lateral extent greater than other
zones in the same stack has not been previously penetrated, the zone remains inaccessible to an occupant
who, on the surface level, is surrounded by a field supporting numerous other wells. Adding further to the
concern would be the recognized right of the belligerent occupant to supplement these existing wells with
‘infill’ wells.
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Occupation’.55 And CIE. Des Chemins de fur du Nord v. German State (1929) saw a
French-German mixed tribunal decide that seizure and operation of a rail line in
Belgian territory for non-military as well as military purposes obligated the German
occupiers to pay, under Hague Regulations Article 53, for all non-military operations.56 In the context of Article 55 specifically, however, the most relevant early
decision went little further than to determine that a private German citizen, acting
under a contract granted by German occupying forces situated in France, was still
obligated to comply with French imposed regulations regarding the logging of a
French public forest.57
The next piece of evidence indicating the need for an occupant to use the produce or
revenues of an occupied state-owned immovable for the purposes of the occupation
itself has to do with a resolution adopted by a meeting of international jurists during
the 1943 London International Law Conference.58 Consonant with the sense
emerging from the just referenced case law that followed World War I, the resolution
provided that an occupant had no right to dispose of property, or of rights or interests
therein, for any purpose except the ‘maintenance of public order and safety in the
occupied territory’. Further, it provided that this limitation was applicable ‘whether
such property, rights or interests [were] those of the State or of private persons or
bodies’. By restricting a belligerent occupant to using property under its authority for
maintaining ‘public order and safety’, the London resolution certainly suggested
dissatisfaction with the thought that an occupant has complete latitude to pick-andchoose how the produce acquired from working a State-owned immovable is to be
applied.
Third, determinations in the trials of lesser war criminals at Nuremberg make clear
that Hague Regulations, including Articles 52, 53, and 55 as well, require a
belligerent occupant to use its control over property in occupied territory only for the
purpose of meeting the expenses of the occupation. The judgment in the trial of the
major war criminals before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
expressly stated that the Hague Regulations, beginning with Article 48, and running
through Articles 55 and 56, ‘dealing with public property, make it clear that under
the rules of war, the economy of an occupied country can only be required to bear the
expenses of the occupation . . .’.59 This interpretation of Article 55 and its associated
provisions received additional confirmation in the lesser war crimes trial of In re
Flick.60 In that case, the US tribunal at Nuremberg determined the Hague Regulations
not to have been violated by German seizure and working of state-owned armament
and train manufacturing facilities in occupied Russian territory. The tribunal noted
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4 Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes [1923–1924] 41, at 44, Ann. Dig. (1923).
9 Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes [1929–1930] 67, Ann. Dig. (1929) 498.
See Administration of Waters and Forests v. Falck, 4 Ann. Dig. (Court of Cassation, France 1927) 563.
Reprinted in G. von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory (1957), at 194–196.
‘Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal’, vol. 1, at 239, 6 Fed. Rules
Dec. (1947) 69, at 120.
See 14 Ann. Dig. (United States Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 1947) 266.

432

EJIL 14 (2003), 417–435

that, due to the facilities’ obvious role in the occupied nation’s war activities, they
stood ‘on a different legal basis’ from other steel plants seized in France that had been
idle at the time of German occupation, but were later activated to assist in Germany’s
war effort.61
A fourth and final piece of evidence on this point, which is especially relevant in
light of the fact the Iraqi situation raises the question of limits on occupying forces’ use
of oil, is the well-known Bataafsche Petroleum case,62 which focused on Japanese
exploitation of occupied oil fields in the Dutch West Indies. While admittedly that case
concerned privately owned oil deposits under Japanese occupation, as has already
been observed, the need for a connection with the expenses of the occupying forces
continues, whether private or public property is involved. In the case’s opinion, the
exploitation of the oil in the occupied territory exceeded what was permitted by the
law of belligerent occupancy, since it went beyond what was necessary for the
demands of the occupant and was ‘for the purpose of supplying the naval, military and
civilian needs of Japan’.63 Such a judgment leaves no doubt that one could not take the
produce from the working of oil fields and expect to apply it without restriction or
limitation. Indeed, use for general military needs, or the needs of the occupant’s (as
distinguished from the occupied power’s) civilian population, would not be
permissible.64
But even accepting that Article 55 implicitly contains a restriction requiring an
occupant to use immovable state-owned property under its control for nothing more
than the expenses of the occupation, the exact parameters of that concept are not
self-defining. ‘Expenses of occupation’ might be seen as including a vast range of
things. In regard to the occupation of Iraq, could it be understood to include the costs
associated with preparing for the invasion, stationing forces overseas and at-theready in advance of the invasion, conducting the military operations that result in the
occupation, administering the oil fields following the successful wrap-up of operations
and the commencement of occupation, providing assistance to the indigenous Iraqi
population in helping the creation of a transitional and, eventually, permanent
governing structure? Could it include the costs associated with rebuilding Iraqi
civilian infrastructure, caring for the dead, wounded, and sick?
While the precise scope of the concept of ‘expenses of occupation’ is somewhat
61
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See ibid., at 270–271.
N.V. de Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij v. The War Damage Commission, 23 I.L.R. 810 (Ct. of App.,
Singapore, 1956).
Ibid., at 821.
It should be noted that even the United States Army Field Manual on the Law of Land Warfare provides that
‘[t]he economy of an occupied country can only be required to bear the expenses of the occupation. . . .’ See
Dept of the Army, The Law of Land Warfare (FM 27–10) (1956), at para. 363 (emphasis added). As general
military expenses or the needs of the occupant’s civilian population are not, strictly speaking, part of the
needs or expenses of the occupation, insisting otherwise would be inconsistent with the determinations of
the Field Manual. See also J. Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict (1954) 697, to the effect that an
occupant’s power over resources can be exercised to meet the occupant’s military needs. However, in
applying the resources to those needs, the occupant must act ‘within the limits of what is required for the
army of occupation and the needs of the local population’. Again, the tie to the occupation expenses is
apparent.
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elusive, it seems entirely safe to say that it would not include the costs of preparing for
an invasion, holding forces overseas and at-the-ready, or conducting the invasion
itself. In the In re Krupp case before the US military tribunal at Nuremberg, the justices
indicated quite plainly that ‘[j]ust as the inhabitants of the occupied territory must not
be forced to help the enemy in waging the war . . ., so must the economic assets of the
occupied territory not be used in such a manner’.65 Any use of Iraqi oil resources for
the purpose of defraying the costs associated with the initial military operation against
that nation would contravene the Krupp case’s basic directive. Factually, that case
involved German business enterprises operating under the authority of occupying
forces to exploit, for the German war effort, the productive facilities of steel and other
industries in various European nations.66 The case’s condemnation of the use of
‘economic assets of . . . occupied territory’ in helping the ‘waging [of] the war’ against
that territory, surely encompasses taking the asset of oil to pay for costs associated
with the military activities leading to the occupation’s installation.
With respect to the costs of administering the occupation of the oil fields, and the
costs necessary to provide assistance to the indigenous population in helping its
transition to a new governing structure, the Nuremberg tribunal’s statement of the
law leaves a belligerent occupant in a substantially stronger, and essentially
unassailable, position. This would also be so in connection with the costs of providing
for new civilian infrastructure, the costs of burying the dead and treating the wounded
and the sick and, obviously, the costs of maintaining the forces of occupation. In all
such situations, the United States and its allies would neither be using the occupied
territory’s economic assets to wage war against that nation, nor using them for
anything other than the benefit of the indigenous population. The only somewhat
questionable situation might concern the costs of administering the oil fields. Clearly,
excessive or imprudent administration costs would inevitably result in a diminution of
net income available for covering other occupation expenses benefiting the local
population. Though not necessarily inevitable, a situation of excess and imprudence
might be thought to arise whenever oil businesses under the jurisdiction of the
occupying power prove to be beneficiaries of oil field opportunities made available as a
consequence of the occupation.67
The problem with viewing such an association as irretrievably tainting the
occupant’s use of either the produce or the revenues from oil field activities is twofold:
it completely undervalues the parallel benefit that may (but may not in every case)
simultaneously flow to the indigenous population as a result of such an association;
and, it suggests that international law requires a rigid separation between the
occupant and those exercising its usufructuary rights. With respect to the former,
while not impossible, the realities of modern commerce make it difficult (and, in some
situations, perhaps even uneconomic) for an occupying power to structure oil field
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operations in a way that wholly ignores business skill and expertise that might be
situated within its own borders and would, thus, be readily accessible. As to the latter,
an obligation to arbitrarily diversify contractors and suppliers by nationality or
otherwise simply does not appear in international law. In the words of one renowned
international scholar, teacher, and jurist, what is required for an ‘occupant’s action
[to have] a solid basis in law’ is that the acts be ‘in good faith for the management of
the community under war conditions and not for his [i.e., the occupant’s] own
enrichment . . . .’68 The occupant, in short, would seem to have a duty to use its best
efforts to, in good faith, maximize returns and minimize costs without regard to
external political pressures. From all appearances, the occupant would be permitted to
rely on the talent and supplies of companies of its nationality, so long as the selection
was economically sound, made in good faith, and not somehow inuring to the
occupant’s ‘own enrichment’.

5 Conclusion
There is little question that the Iraqi people have suffered tremendously since Saddam
Hussein’s rise to power in 1979. The 12 years intervening the conclusion of the 1991
Gulf War have witnessed the international community’s laboured efforts to secure
Iraq’s observance of its UN commitments regarding weapons of mass destruction.69 In
the event that military force becomes essential to compel observance, occupation of
Iraq’s oil fields could present the occupying force with a variety of difficult problems.
The focus of this brief essay has been on three specific problems regarding the rights
and responsibilities of any occupying force. The latitude enunciated on the role that
current technologies can play in both increasing access to deposits and the rate or
volume of production therefrom, and the limits stated in connection with the uses to
which oil and its revenues can be put, prove most relevant in the context of the larger
question about oil’s future in the rebuilding of Iraq.
Only the passage of time will actually reveal how that question is answered. In view
of Iraq’s oil wealth, however, both the potential for great progress and the potential for
great mischief are apparent. There can be little doubt that some ambitious politicos
may populate the ranks of the well-groomed Iraqi expatriots who have passed their
time in the safety of foreign capitals. And even within the borders of Iraq, there are
undoubtedly many who would willingly carve up that nation and its oil to advance
their own personal ethnic or religious agenda. The expectation, however, is that an
occupying force would appreciate the genuinely significant opportunities for
68
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reconstructing Iraq inherent in the oil wealth which providence has bestowed on this
desert nation. The dictates of international law inherent in Article 55 of the Hague
Regulations and related international juridical decisions, as well as observations of
learned commentators, provide enlightened guidance assisting the occupant if such a
course is pursued. The restoration, the working, and the enhancement of Iraqi oil
fields, and the use of the proceeds therefrom, must be directed towards facilitating the
evolution of a valued and productive member of the community of nations.

